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 In today’s world, no jurisdiction is immune to the propensity for violence.  Law 
enforcement administrators have a duty to their citizens to have a plan of action in the 
event a tactical team is needed.  Whether they employ their own or call upon another 
jurisdiction, agencies must be ready for a high risk call.   
Too many times, law enforcement agencies with part time tactical teams find 
themselves struggling to maintain recommended training hours, purchase necessary 
equipment, and select the proper personnel.   This is usually due to limited budgets and 
small applicant pools.  When these agencies attempt to deploy an insufficiently 
selected, inadequately trained, and poorly equipped tactical team, agency 
administrators are setting themselves, their department, and governmental jurisdictions 
up for liability exposure.   
 Departments with part time tactical teams and limited resources should seek to 
develop and implement a multi-jurisdictional tactical team with neighboring agencies to 
limit liability and enhance capabilities.   This is particularly important when it comes to 
sound policy, supervision, training, and selection of officers on tactical teams.  This 
model can mitigate liability exposure in the event of a lawsuit.   
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Police departments across the nation have a duty to provide effective police 
service and protection to the communities they serve.  Often times, these communities 
experience highly dangerous situations that require the use of Special Weapons and 
Tactics (SWAT) teams to resolve.  Calls for service that require a specialized response 
can include hostage situations and barricaded suspects as well as high-risk search and 
arrest warrants where the subject or subjects of the warrants have or are suspected to 
have a propensity for violence.   
The dangerous nature of these incidents and the frequency of occurrence 
dictates that officers must be uniquely qualified, rigorously selected, highly trained, and 
appropriately equipped to provide the citizens with the proper protection and to protect 
the agency from unnecessary exposure to liability.  Smaller agencies with fewer human 
and equipment resources often face difficulties in meeting the tactical needs and proper 
training of their jurisdictions.  Communities, regardless of their size, are not immune 
from violence and critical incidents, and police agencies nationwide must be prepared 
and equipped to provide an effective tactical response. 
The trend in regionalization of police responses to specialized operations began 
to spread significantly based on recommendations from the President’s Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice report of 1967 (“President's 
Commision,” 1967). These multi-jurisdictional efforts were intended to pool resources of 
multiple agencies so that the needs of these agencies could be better met when dealing 
with specific types of criminal offenses and critical incidents.  In the early 1970s, these 
efforts developed into task forces targeting specific types of crimes such as narcotics 
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trafficking (U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, n.d.).  As law enforcfement 
regionalization grew, agencies began to consider and implement formation of 
regionalized tactical assets to address issues faced by smaller agencies in trying to 
meet tactical needs.  Agencies seeking to deploy technically specialized and advanced 
tactical units requires a large investment with training and equipment.  Personnel must 
first be trained and equipment purchased prior to deployment of these deployments.  
When agencies pool their resources together, the cost is spread out, thus becoming a 
more viable and affordable option for departments (Berkowitz, 2015).    
POSITION 
Agency administrators must think about their agency’s response to highly critical 
incidents requiring a calculated tactical response and consider their options for a tactical 
team that falls within their agencies means and capabilities.  If the agency administrator 
feels their agency is not training adequately, have the right personnel or are properly 
equipped, they should consider other options.  The National Tactical Officers 
Association (NTOA) (2015) defined a special weapons and tactics team as “Designated 
law enforcement teams, whose members are recruited, selected, trained, equipped and 
assigned to resolve critical incidents involving a threat to public safety which would 
otherwise exceed the capabilities of traditional law enforcement first responders and/or 
investigative units” (p. 10).  The proper selection of a tactical officer should include 
experience, a physical fitness test, firearms proficiency, a background investigation, an 
oral board, a psychological exam, no sustained excessive use of force complaints, 
letters of recommendation from supervisors, and their last two evaluations (Koepp, 
2000).   Additionally, the candidate should undergo a series of evaluations to prove 
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mental judgment under stress, firearms proficiency under stress and fatigue, and the 
ability to solve problems under stress and exhaustion.  Any government agency using a 
tactical team without the proper training, equipment, and support is setting itself up for 
liability exposure.          
There have been many events in law enforcement history that have contributed 
to the creation of special weapons and tactics teams worldwide.  The first special 
weapons and tactics team was created in Los Angeles, California in response to the 
Watts riots that began in August of 1965. The Watts riots began as a routine traffic stop 
for driving while intoxicated.  The department’s response was to deploy more police 
cars and officers to the area, which proved to be ineffective given the state of relations 
between the police and the community at the time.  It turns out that the heavy-handed 
response by police likely contributed to the riots continuance (Mijares & McCarthy, 
2008).  During the Watts riots, 34 people were killed and 1,032 people were injured.  
There was also an undetermined amount of property damage that occurred (Mijares & 
McCarthy, 2008). Upon the conclusion of the riots, the department determined their 
officers were ill-equipped and poorly trained to properly handle the situation. 
In 1966, a former United States Marine ascended the Tower at the University of 
Texas in Austin and shot and killed 16 people with a sniper rifle.  Although the officers 
who responded to this critical incident eventually resolved it by killing the suspect, a 
properly equipped and trained special weapons and tactics team likely would have 
resolved the situation much sooner, saving many lives (Mijares & McCarthy, 2000).  
This incident, among many others, contributed to the formation of specially trained 
officers in high risk incidents.  
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 Then, in 1974, the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), a domestic terrorist 
organization consisting of 44 members, responsible for two murders, several bank 
robberies, and attempts to kill police officers, were being sought by the Los Angeles 
police.  On May 16, 1974, two members of the SLA botched an attempted shoplifting at 
a sporting goods store in a suburb of Los Angeles.  Using a traffic citation in a vehicle 
abandoned by the SLA members, LAPD was able to locate the SLA safe house and 
surrounded the residence.  The Los Angeles Special Weapons and Tactics unit 
engaged in a shootout with the SLA and killed 6 members of their organization.  No 
officers or innocent citizens were injured in the incident (Mijares & McCarthy, 2008).  
This incident was an incentive for other agencies large in the United States to form their 
own SWAT teams.  
The NTOA (2015) recommends standards and best practices by “providing a 
credible and proven training resource as well as a forum for the development of tactics 
and information” (p. 4). In order to mitigate liability exposure for tactical teams, a 
professional tactical team should adhere to best practices and the recommendations for 
training, selection, and policy development from the NTOA.  It takes a minimum of 17 
operators to form an effective and properly functioning tactical team (The National 
Tactical Officers Association, 2015).  In 2011, the NTOA began reviewing and updating 
their recommendations for standards and training to bring tactical officers up to 
contemporary best practices. This comes at an important time, as public scrutiny of 
police officers and the tactics they use has been increasing.  Simply put, the 
standardization of SWAT teams and the expectation that SWAT teams adhere to 
recognized best standards is more important than ever before (NTOA, 2015).     
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Agencies that operate part-time special weapons and tactics teams without 
proper supervision and support are setting themselves up for liability exposure.   Many 
agencies do the best they can with what they have.  However, while these teams may 
have good intentions to do the best with what they have, this will not mitigate their 
exposure to liability.  Having a tactical team that does not meet the generally accepted 
police practices can lead to liability (Ryan, 2007). 
Tactical teams must train to the latest best practices and industry standards.  The 
NTOA (2015) provides the best information and assistance in the arena of special 
weapons and tactics and every effort should be made for teams to follow these 
standards.  The NTOA also recommends that if part time tactical teams with limited 
resources cannot meet the best practices and industry standards, then they should 
regionalize with neighboring agencies to form a multi-jurisdictional team to share 
resources and enhance capabilities.   The NTOA (2015) stated, “It is the position of the 
NTOA that the decision to form a SWAT team carries with it the responsibility to provide 
the ongoing training, equipment, leadership and financial support necessary to create 
and maintain an effective team” (p. 7). 
Law enforcement agencies are commonly asked to do as much as they can with 
limited resources.  These reduced resources include limited manpower, stretching 
training budgets, and utilizing limited and outdated equipment.  Law enforcement 
training in general is expensive, especially in the area of tactical training.  Courses in 
tactical training are very expensive with cost of courses, lodging, and meals, which can 
deplete a training budget very quickly.  
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Equipment expenditures can also deplete budgets very quickly.  Based on 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) guidelines, teams must meet specific 
equipment recommendations to meet industry standards in team capabilities (U.S. 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2005).  FEMA Type II resource 
recommendations are the common goal for part-time regional SWAT teams.   
Imagine an agency with 50 officers wanting to form their own special weapons 
and tactics team.  This agency would not be able to dedicate enough people to create 
an effective team since the NTOA advises that an effective team should have a 
minimum of 17 operators.  The applicant pool would be too small and the training 
requirements would be extremely difficult to achieve.  With training requirements being 
16 hours per month at a minimum and a 40 hour annual training session, small 
agencies would have a difficult time meeting these standards (NTOA, 2015). 
When neighboring law enforcement agencies are having a difficult time 
managing a team, it only makes sense to pool their resources together and form a 
regional team.  The applicant pool is expanded, and each agency can manage the 
training hours more effectively, thereby mitigating failure to train liabilities. 
The financial burden is divided among the partnering agencies.   Once the 
regional team is formed and a city has a need for the tactical team, the city where the 
high risk incident is occurring still has ultimate control and authority of the team.  The 
team is just an asset provided to each city that will be an option for the incident 
commander to use if needed.  At no time does the tactical team take over the scene.  
This is an important aspect to creating the multi-jurisdictional team.  Cities will still 
maintain control of their incidents. 
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Police agencies who participate in regional special weapons and tactics teams 
are providing their citizens with better service and better trained officers.  They are 
minimizing liability exposure and demonstrating their ability to properly respond to high 
risk incidents.  Each jurisdiction is provided with a higher quality team and benefits from 
pooled resources and enhanced capabilities.  Additionally, better training, better 
recruitment, and a more effective selection process enhances the retention of highly 
qualified officers.  Finally, with the opportunities to gain more resources from member 
agencies by pooling together, the multi-jurisdictional special weapons and tactics team 
has a higher chance of success when responding to high risk incidents.   
COUNTER POSITION 
 Although many in law enforcement view SWAT as a means to a safer end for all 
involved, some within the law enforcement community see regionalization as giving up 
too much control of their own resources.  Others outside the law enforcement industry 
see SWAT as an unnecessary militarization of law enforcement agencies.  The 
utilization of perceived military weapons and equipment are deemed over aggressive 
and unnecessary.  This can also give agency administrators hesitations when dealing 
with tactical teams. 
 From within the law enforcement community, many agency heads and 
government executives see the proposed implementation of regional SWAT teams as 
threats to their ability to maintain control of their own personnel and assets thereby 
avoiding further liability and accountability.  In Bergen County, New Jersey, the 
prosecutor’s office proposed that Bergen County law enforcement agencies regionalize 
their SWAT teams.  The proposal and ultimate implementation of the regional SWAT 
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idea met resistance from the county executive.  Bergen County Executive Kathleen 
Donovan accused the prosecutor of “"playing politics" by taking control of the county 
SWAT team away from the embattled Bergen County Police Department and putting 
it under the control of the County Sheriff (Sullivan, 2013).  Donovan also stated that 
she feels as if the prosecutor is trying to remove control from local law enforcement 
heads and give it to the sheriff’s department (Sullivan, 2013).  In a separate article 
months later, Donovan still maintained her stance that the risk of participating in the 
regional SWAT concept was not one she was willing to take.  Donovan stated, "I will not 
obligate and saddle the taxpayers of Bergen County with any liability expenses or costs 
associated with this plan" (Ensslin, 2014, para 11).  Thomas B. Hanrahan, attorney for 
the Bergen County Police Chiefs Association supported Donovan in her stance against 
regional SWAT by writing that he felt the participation in regional SWAT exposed 
agencies to liability for the actions of the officers serving on the regional SWAT team 
(Ensslin, 2014, para. 23).  However, in order for each law enforcement agency to 
maintain control of their personnel and resources, an interlocal agreement as defined in 
the Texas Government Code can establish that each participating agency can maintain 
control of their personnel and resources assigned to the regional team; this makes 
overreach a non-issue. (Intergovernmental Relations, Chpt. 791.013). 
  For many outside the law enforcement profession, SWAT is seen as an 
overused and unnecessary militarization of police forces all over the nation.  In a study 
published by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), they stated, “Militarization of 
policing encourages officers to adopt a “warrior” mentality and think of the people they 
are supposed to serve as enemies” (ACLU, 2014, p. 3).  Further, the ACLU insists that 
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the utilization of military equipment procured through the Department of Defense’s 1033 
Program adds to the “stockpile” of unnecessary equipment by police agencies (ACLU, 
2014).   
In Davis County, Utah, a former sheriff’s son-in-law was killed by members of the 
Davis County Sheriff’s Department SWAT Team.  Former Sheriff Williams “Dub” 
Lawrence’s son-in-law suffered from mental health issues and was shot and killed 
during an incident where it is alleged that Lawrence’s son-in-law had assaulted 
Lawrence’s daughter.  A Newsweek article described the scene that Lawrence 
witnessed as “ultra-violent” with “more than 80 tactical officers from numerous police 
departments” taking part in the incident and being armed with “the type of heavy 
weapons normally deployed in Helmand Province (Afghanistan),” turning Lawrence into 
a protagonist for SWAT (Burleigh, 2015, para. 5).  Lawrence, who started the agency’s 
SWAT team now feels that instead of deterring violence, officers dressed in military 
gear escalate incidents (Burleigh, 2015).  
 In an article in Police One, retired Lieutanant Dan Marcou (2014) listed several 
rebuttals to the ACLU article.  In reference to wearing helmets and Kevlar vests, these 
are protective in nature and not offensive.  When citizens see patrol officers, they are on 
foot patrol, bike patrol, on horseback, and in police cars.  These same officers are 
wearing regular duty belts, uniforms, and hidden body armor.  When a high risk incident 
occurs, officers with a higher level of protective equipment arrive to handle the situation.  
These incidents are a higher risk and have a higher level of threat that officers must be 
prepared for.   Officers must be prepared for worst case scenarios and have the tools to 
protect themselves and the citizens they serve (Marcou, 2014). 
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RECOMMENDATION 
Smaller law enforcement jurisdictions with part time SWAT teams should join 
together in order to form a multi-jurisdictional SWAT team, so they are able to combine 
resources, increase training abilities, and reduce liability exposure for the involved 
agencies.  When smaller law enforcement agencies are faced with violent incidents that 
require a tactical and specialized response, those agencies are often unable to provide 
the necessary resources to resolve the incident effectively.  Agencies with part time 
SWAT teams, that fail to train and select the proper personnel for the tactical team, are 
setting their agency up for liability.   Different agencies have different selection 
processes (Koepp, 2000).  All candidates should go through rigorous screening and 
testing before being allowed to participate on a SWAT team.  Agencies that participate 
in regional teams have a larger selection pool to choose from when selecting officers to 
the SWAT team.   Regional teams share the financial burden of training, resources, and 
human resources for critical incidents.   The NTOA makes recommendations on the 
best practices and industry standards for SWAT teams and every effort to follow best 
practices should be adhered to when forming a regional SWAT team.   
Agency executives have to be mindful of the political climate surrounding SWAT 
teams.  There are several articles referring to the militarization of the police and several 
recent incidents causing controversy regarding the use of SWAT teams.  With the 
proper training, equipment, and effective use of SWAT teams, this stigma can be 
overcome.  Agencies must know when it is appropriate to use SWAT teams effectively.   
 Agency administrators are understandably apprehensive of losing control of their 
personnel and not having final decision making authority on a critical incident when 
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being part of a regional team or using the regional team.   Under the incident command 
structure, the jurisdiction where the critical incident is taking place will have full 
command authority as to how the use of the regional SWAT team will occur.  The 
regional team will be a supplemental asset to assist with advising options to the incident 
commander of the jurisdiction where the incident is occurring (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, n.d.).  Ultimately, police agencies with part-time special weapons 
and tactics teams and limited resources should seek to develop and implement a multi-
jurisdictional tactical team with neighboring agencies to limit liability exposure and 
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